NEW DELHI: The BJP’s decision to give two prominent Muslim leaders from Uttar Pradesh key positions in its new national team comes at a significant moment in the state where assembly elections will be due in early 2027.
The appointments of former Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) vice-chancellor Tariq Mansoor as BJP national vice-president and Uttar Pradesh BJP Minority Morcha chief Kunwar Basit Ali as national chief of the Minority Morcha point to a strategy that goes beyond representation. The larger calculation is about whether the BJP can make even limited gains among Muslim voters in a state where the community has traditionally remained outside its electoral coalition.
For the BJP, Uttar Pradesh presents a challenge. Muslim voters account for roughly 20 per cent of the population and are electorally significant across regions. The party has made repeated attempts in recent years to woo sections of the community, particularly Pasmanda Muslims (socially and economically marginalised Muslim groups) and beneficiaries of central welfare schemes. Mansoor and Ali’s appointments give that outreach a more visible face.
Mansoor’s elevation is particularly significant because of his profile. As a former vice-chancellor of AMU and a current member of the Uttar Pradesh legislative council, he brings an academic background and a degree of social standing that is different from the BJP’s traditional political leadership. He joined the party in 2023 and subsequently entered the state legislature.
Mansoor’s appointment as national vice-president also gives the BJP a Muslim face at one of its highest organisational levels. He belongs to the Qureshi community, which places him within the wider Pasmanda outreach being pursued by the BJP.
That distinction matters in Uttar Pradesh because the BJP is not necessarily attempting to win the Muslim electorate as a whole. Its more realistic objective has been to create divisions within a largely consolidated bloc and attract smaller sections that do not see their interests as identical to those of the wider community.
Mansoor’s background could help that effort. His association with AMU gives him recognition beyond conventional party politics, while his links with senior BJP and RSS leaders have made him a familiar figure within the party’s wider outreach efforts. His elevation now gives that outreach a bigger platform.
Ali represents a more organisational version of the same strategy. Unlike Mansoor, whose profile comes largely from academia and public institutions, Ali has spent years building a network within the BJP’s minority wing. He began his political journey in the party in 2011 and went on to hold district and regional responsibilities before becoming president of the Uttar Pradesh BJP Minority Morcha in 2021. His background as a Muslim Rajput from western Uttar Pradesh also gives the party a face rooted in a region where the contest for Dalit, OBC and minority votes is particularly important.
Ali’s work has focused heavily on taking the BJP’s welfare and political messaging to Muslims. He has been associated with campaigns such as Modi Mitra and Shukriya Modi Bhaijaan, the latter aimed particularly at Muslim women ahead of the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. He also helped promote an Urdu compilation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Mann Ki Baat broadcasts as part of the party’s attempt to reach voters who remain distant from the BJP.
The BJP’s interest in Muslim women is itself part of a larger electoral calculation. The party has repeatedly highlighted schemes and measures that it argues have benefited women, including its legislation against instant triple talaq. The aim has been to create a constituency that may not identify with the BJP politically but could respond to specific welfare or policy interventions.
Whether that strategy can produce actual votes in Uttar Pradesh is a different question. The 2024 Lok Sabha election showed how strongly caste and community consolidation can shape the state’s politics. The BJP’s tally fell sharply from 62 seats in 2019 to 33, while the Samajwadi Party and Congress together won 43 seats. The SP’s success was built in large part around the PDA formula of backward, Dalit and minority voters.
That makes the BJP’s Muslim outreach particularly relevant for 2027. The party has been trying to counter the SP’s PDA narrative by broadening its own social coalition. Its approach has included outreach to non-Yadav OBC groups, Dalit communities and Pasmanda Muslims.
There is also a regional calculation. Western Uttar Pradesh has a substantial Muslim population and remains politically competitive after the 2024 election. Ali’s background in Meerut and his long organisational work could therefore be useful as the party prepares for the state campaign.
At the same time, the appointments should not be read as evidence that the BJP has fundamentally changed its relationship with the Muslim electorate. The party continues to rely heavily on its core Hindutva and welfare politics. Nor is there any guarantee that Muslim voters will respond to the outreach simply because the party has elevated two Muslim leaders.
The appointments are better understood as an attempt to build political bridges where the BJP has historically had limited access. Mansoor gives the party a nationally recognisable Muslim face with an academic and Pasmanda background while Ali brings a grassroots organisational network and experience of working directly with minority voters.
