NEW DELHI: When Donald Trump meets Xi Jinping in Washington on September 24, the important questions for India are what Trump wants from China, what Xi is prepared to offer, and how the outcome changes Washington’s calculation of what it needs from India. India need not worry about a grand bargain; that is not happening.
The meeting follows months of negotiations over trade, rare earths, technology, and other economic issues. Financial links between China and Iran have also entered the discussions. The United States and China are trying to manage parts of their economic relationship while their strategic competition continues.
For India, this provides a useful test of an assumption that has shaped much of its thinking about Washington. India’s importance to the United States has grown partly because of the economic and military challenge posed by China.
If Trump can secure some of what he wants directly from Beijing, India’s immediate value to Washington could change in particular areas. If negotiations produce little, India’s importance could increase. But a frustrated Trump could also respond by increasing pressure on India.
Trade remains central to the negotiations. Washington wants better access for American goods, greater balance in bilateral trade, and compliance with Chinese commitments. Beijing wants tariff relief and greater certainty for Chinese exporters. The two governments are also discussing mechanisms to manage trade in selected areas under the arrangements established during their May understanding.
Rare earths and other critical minerals have become particularly important. China dominates their processing and has shown it can use export controls as an economic instrument. Washington wants China to honour its commitments and provide greater reliability for American industry. This directly connects to India.
Delhi has been developing its own critical-mineral capabilities and positioning India as part of the diversification of global supply chains. Greater reliability in the US-China mineral trade would not remove the American interest in alternative suppliers.
Still, it could reduce the immediate pressure to develop them and alter their economic value. Technology presents a more difficult area. Washington continues to regard China as its principal technological competitor in several fields, particularly advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence.
At the same time, both governments have an interest in managing the risks created by intense technological competition. AI has consequently entered the wider US-China dialogue, although the underlying competition remains substantial.
For India, the issue is access and relevance. India has benefited from expanding US technology partnerships and American efforts to build trusted supply chains outside China.
If Washington and Beijing establish mechanisms to manage parts of their technology competition, India will need to show that its technological and industrial capabilities provide value that Washington cannot readily obtain elsewhere.
Iran adds another dimension to the negotiations. The Trump administration has been using financial sanctions and other measures to constrain Tehran, while China remains an important economic partner for Iran. US Treasury officials have said China’s financial links with Iran are part of discussions with Beijing.
This matters directly to India. India’s interests in Iran extend across energy, connectivity, and the security of the Gulf. Chabahar is an important example, while the security of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has wider implications for India’s economy and energy supplies. If Washington obtains Chinese cooperation on Iran, Beijing becomes useful to the United States on an issue in which India also has significant interests.
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