In a recent column for the Print, R. Jagannathan argues that India’s path to progress is stalled by a “sell-by date” version of Muslim politics, suggesting that “secular” parties have long survived on symbolic concessions and “appeasement.” Using the 2026 election results in West Bengal as a focal point, the author posits that a shift in Hindu tactical voting and a supposed failure of Muslim polarisation signal the end of this era.
However, a dispassionate look at verified socio-economic data and electoral trends reveals that this narrative is not just reductive—it is factually untethered from the lived reality of India’s largest minority. To suggest that India’s challenges hinge on “Muslim politics changing” is to ignore the structural exclusions that have defined the community’s status for decades.
The following analysis challenges the core premise of the ‘appeasement’ theory by aligning the author’s claims against verified socio-political benchmarks.
*The “Appeasement” Paradox: Poverty Amidst “Concessions”*
The central pillar of the article is the claim of “symbolic concessions to appease Muslims.” If Muslims were truly being “appeased” by successive governments, one would expect to see this reflected in their socio-economic indicators. However, the *Sachar Committee Report* and subsequent data from the *Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS)* tell a different story. Muslims continue to have the lowest work participation rate among all religious groups and are disproportionately represented in the informal sector. “Appeasement” that results in systemic educational and economic lag is a sociological impossibility; in reality, “symbolic concessions” have often been a cheap substitute for substantive development.
*The Fallacy of the “En Bloc” Vote*
Jagannathan asserts that Muslims “vote en bloc to keep the BJP out.” This treats nearly 200 million people as a political monolith. Empirical data from organisations like *CSDS-Lokniti* consistently show that Muslim voting patterns are as diverse as the Indian landscape. In Bihar, UP, and West Bengal, Muslim votes split between various regional players (TMC, RJD, SP, Congress, and even the Left) based on local candidate merit and developmental promises. To label tactical voting for survival as “polarisation” ignores the fact that any community facing exclusionary rhetoric will naturally gravitate toward parties promising constitutional protection.
*Misreading West Bengal: It Wasn’t Just Religion, It Was Governance*
The author cites the 2026 West Bengal results (specifically the BJP winning 72 of 142 Muslim-heavy seats) as evidence that Muslim polarisation failed. This interpretation ignores the “Silent Voter” and the localized nature of Indian elections. If the BJP made inroads in these seats, it often had less to do with a rejection of “secularism” and more to do with anti-incumbency, local corruption, or the effective delivery of central welfare schemes like *PM Awas Yojana* or *Ujjwala*. By framing every seat win or loss through a communal lens, the author ignores the “aspirational” Indian voter who—regardless of religion—votes for better roads, electricity, and jobs.
*The “Hindu Tactical Voting” Double Standard*
The article suggests that Hindus are “choosing to vote in a tactical way” to counter “divisive caste and Muslim appeasement.” This frames Hindu consolidation as a rational response while framing Muslim consolidation as a threat to progress. In a healthy democracy, all communities vote based on their interests. Labelling the voting patterns of one group as “tactical” and the other as “communal” creates a false hierarchy of citizenship. If Hindu voters are moving away from caste-based politics, it is often toward a unified religious identity—which is, by definition, its own form of identity politics, no less “divisive” than what the author critiques.
*The Bogey of the “Third Force” (AIMIM)*
The author suggests that the AIMIM-AJUP alliance could have further damaged the “secular” parties. However, historical data from 2021 and 2024 shows that parties like the AIMIM often struggle in Bengal because the Bengali Muslim identity is frequently tied more to language and regional culture than to the pan-Islamic identity Owaisi represents. The failure of these “spoilers” isn’t a failure of Muslim politics; it is a conscious choice by voters to avoid fragmenting their mandate in a way that benefits a party they perceive as ideologically hostile.
*Geopolitical Challenges and Internal Cohesion*
Finally, Jagannathan suggests that “Muslim politics has to change” for India to meet “geopolitical challenges.”
On the contrary, India’s greatest geopolitical strength has long been its pluralism. Attempts to marginalise the political agency of 14% of the population do not strengthen India on the world stage; they create internal fault lines that rivals exploit. Authentic national progress requires an “Internalisation of Inclusion,” not a demand that one community abandon its political interests as a prerequisite for national success.
*Beyond Identity: Toward a Politics of Substantive Inclusion*
The narrative of “Muslim appeasement” has become a convenient rhetorical device to bypass the harder conversation about systemic inequality. India does indeed face economic and social challenges, but they are rooted in jobless growth, educational gaps, and crumbling infrastructure—not in the way Muslims cast their ballots. To move forward, we must stop viewing the Muslim vote as a “problem to be solved” and start viewing Muslim citizens as partners in a development story that has, for too long, left them on the margins.
A point by point rebuttal to R. Jagannathan’s recent column in the Print: https://tinyurl.com/t7x2zjtd
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~Hasnain Naqvi is a former member of the history faculty at St. Xavier’s College, Mumbai….
The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.
